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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3022
___________
XUE MEI CHEN
                                                                  Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A97-331-546)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Alberto Riefkohl
_______________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
DECEMBER 1, 2008
Before:   MCKEE, NYGAARD, AND ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: January 12, 2009)
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
 Xue Mei Chen petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
final order of removal.  For the following reasons, we will grant her petition.
2I.
Chen, a native and citizen of China, arrived in this country without valid
documents in September 2004.  She claimed during airport and credible fear interviews
and in an asylum application that she fled China because a local official’s son raped and
impregnated her and she was forced to have an abortion.  After retaining new counsel,
however, she claimed in an amended application that she fled China because she feared
persecution for her practice of Falun Gong.  She concedes removability, but seeks asylum,
withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture on that basis.
Before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Chen disavowed her initial claim and
testified that she had made it on the advice of the “snakehead” who smuggled her out of
China and told her that she would be sent back if she disclosed her practice of Falun
Gong.  She also testified about her experience with Falun Gong and Chinese authorities. 
According to Chen, she and her younger brother started to practice Falun Gong in 1998. 
In 1999, after Falun Gong was outlawed, Chinese authorities arrested them, detained
them for eight or nine hours, kicked her in the legs and forced them to sign a statement
disavowing Falun Gong and promising not to practice it.  She stopped practicing but,
several years later, a friend convinced her to hand out Falun Gong pamphlets.  Someone
told the authorities, who came to her house, searched her room and discovered the Falun
Gong pamphlets.  They arrested her and again detained her for eight or nine hours,
slapping her five or six times and hitting her “around the hip area,” finally letting her go
    The IJ initially noted that “[Chen’s] case is obviously effected [sic] by the prior1
statements and suffers from a basic lack of credibility as to the Court can accept the
excuse for the first false statements in consideration for the basis for relief.”  (IJ Decision
at 9, A.45.)  Whatever that statement might mean, the IJ ultimately concluded that he
“tend[ed] to believe” Chen’s explanation, (id. at 10, A.46), and, as the Government
concedes, never made an adverse credibility determination.
    We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. §2
1252(a)(1).  Because the BIA affirmed the IJ’s order without opinion, we review the
decision of the IJ.  See Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review
the IJ’s factual finding for substantial evidence and must uphold them ‘“unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’”  Chukwu v.
Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
Nevertheless, The IJ’s conclusions “must be based on the record, not on conjecture or
unsupported suppositions about conditions in the applicant’s country.”  Id. 
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after she promised to tell them who had given her the pamphlets.  Instead of going home,
she went to stay with an aunt.  Authorities started “harassing” her parents after they found
out that she had “escaped,” so her aunt arranged for her passage to the United States.  In
addition to this testimony, Chen submitted an affidavit from her mother and the 2004
country report detailing the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in China.
The IJ, without making a credibility determination, denied relief after concluding
that Chen had failed to prove that she actually practiced Falun Gong in China.   The BIA1
affirmed without opinion.2
II.
Aliens are eligible for asylum if they show a well-founded fear of persecution, see
Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 188, and are entitled to withholding of removal or relief under CAT
if they show that persecution or torture is more likely than not, see Jarbough v. Att’y
    The IJ concluded that “nothing major was done” to Chen.  (IJ Decision at 9, A.45.)3
We agree, as the Government argues, that Chen’s mistreatment did not rise to the level of
persecution.  See, e.g., Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 191.
    The REAL ID Act of 2005 codified this principle at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), but4
Chen filed her asylum application before May 11, 2005, so the statutory provision does
not apply to her.  See Toure, 443 F.3d at 326 n.9.
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Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2007).  A showing of past persecution gives the alien
a rebuttable presumption of future persecution.  See id.  Although the IJ did not discuss
Chen’s claims precisely in these terms, we construe his decision as concluding that Chen
had failed to show either past persecution or a well-founded fear or likelihood of future
persecution.  We agree with the first conclusion.   The second, however, is not supported3
by substantial evidence.
The IJ properly acknowledged that the practice of Falun Gong can provide a basis
for immigration relief.  He also did not make an adverse credibility finding, so “we will
proceed as if the applicant’s testimony were credible.”  Toure, 443 F.3d at 326.   We also4
note that credible testimony alone may be sufficient to carry an applicant’s burden of
proof.  See Jishiashvili v. Att’y Gen., 402 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2005).  The IJ
nevertheless denied relief on the sole basis that that Chen had not proven that she
practiced Falun Gong in China.  The IJ based that ruling on three primary conclusions,
each of which is problematic.  
First, the IJ stated that Chen “has not provided the Court with any type of
corroborating information” regarding her practice of Falun Gong or mistreatment by
    The Government argues that this affidavit conflicts with Chen’s testimony in several5
respects, but the IJ did not base his ruling on those alleged conflicts or otherwise evaluate
the affidavit.  We may not do so in the first instance.  See Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 189.
    For this reason, the relevant inquiry is not, as the Government insists, whether a6
reasonable trier of fact would be compelled to conclude that corroborating evidence is
unavailable.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).  See also Toure, 443 F.3d at 325 (noting that the
REAL ID Act does not alter IJs obligation to apply the three-part framework).
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authorities (IJ Decision at 9, A.45), and later referred again to “the lack of any kind of
corroboration,” (id. at 11, A.47).  As Chen argues, however, she provided a corroborating
affidavit from her mother, which the IJ did not discuss.  (A.248-249.)   See Toure, 4435
F.3d at 323 (noting that the BIA recognizes “letters from family members” as forms of
corroboration).  Moreover, as Chen also argues, the IJ did not follow the three-step
procedure required before denying a claim for lack of corroboration.  See Chukwu, 484
F.3d at 191-92 (“[T]he failure to produce corroborating information may undermine an
applicant’s case where (1) the IJ identifies facts for which it is reasonable to expect
corroboration, (2) the applicant fails to corroborate, and (3) the applicant fails to
adequately explain that failure.”).  In particular, although the IJ mentioned that “[t]here’s
no record of any of the actions taken against her,” he did not explain what he expected
Chen to produce or why it was reasonable to expect her to produce it, and did not decide
whether corroborating evidence was or was not available.6
Second, the IJ found it “strange” that Chen’s parents suffered no direct
consequences as a result of her practice of Falun Gong.  (IJ Decision at 9-10, A.45-46.) 
Both Chen’s testimony and her mother’s affidavit, however, make it clear that her parents
    The IJ based this conclusion on his personal experience in “[h]aving dealt with the7
Chinese government now, for almost a period of 30 years[.]”  (IJ Decision at 10, A.46.) 
The Government argues that such experience is a sufficient basis for this conclusion and
cites a concurring opinion for the proposition that “[w]here the IJ relies on his or her
expert knowledge of general country conditions to draw inferences of plausibility, it may
be that these inferences are worthy of deference.”  Jishiashvili, 402 F.3d at 398 (Aldisert,
J., concurring).  Judge Aldisert, however, made that statement merely by way of noting
that there “may be” exceptions to the general principle that reviewing courts are as
competent as IJs to assess plausibility.  Id.  His opinion certainly does not stand for the
proposition that an IJ’s conclusions need not be based on the record, which the majority
in Jishiashvili squarely reaffirmed they must.  See id. at 393.  See also Toure, 443 F.3d at
316 (“deference is expressly conditioned on support in the record”).  The Government
also argues that this conclusion is supported by record evidence of “oppressive conduct”
by the Chinese government in general.  The IJ himself, however, did not base his
conclusion on that evidence.  Even if he had, general oppressiveness hardly supports the
specific assumption that the Chinese government punishes the non-practicing parents of
Falun Gong practitioners.
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themselves never practiced Falun Gong.  The IJ’s apparent assumption that the Chinese
government generally punishes parents for the crimes of their children does not have
record support.7
Finally, the IJ noted that Chen had not made any connections with Falun Gong
practitioners in New York City, from which he concluded that she is not practicing Falun
Gong “freely” in the United States.  (IJ Decision at 11, A.47.)  He further believed that
this conclusion bolstered his conclusion that Chen had not actually practiced Falun Gong
in China.  (Id.)  Chen, however, testified that she practices Falun Gong several times a
week, both inside and outside her home.  Once again, there is no record support for the
IJ’s assumption that this manner of private practice somehow is inconsistent with Chen
    The Government argues that Chen’s failure to corroborate her practice of Falun Gong8
in the United States was part of the basis of the IJ’s decision and cites testimony that it
claims made it reasonable for the IJ to expect such corroboration.  The IJ, however, did
not fault Chen for failing to corroborate her practice of Falun Gong in the United States
or rely on any of the testimony that the Government cites.  Instead, he concluded that
Chen’s manner of practice in the United States – i.e., privately, and without making
contact with other Falun Gong practitioners – is inconsistent with her having practiced in
China.  As explained above, that conclusion lacks record support.
                                                                   7
having practiced Falun Gong in China.8
Accordingly, we will grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order of
removal, and remand for further proceedings.  On remand, the BIA is directed to
reevaluate Chen’s claims in light of this opinion.
